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Previous research has shown that the prospect of attaining a reward can promote taskengagement, up-regulate attention toward reward-relevant information, and facilitate
enhanced encoding of new information into declarative memory. However, past
research on reward-based enhancement of declarative memory has focused primarily
on paradigms in which rewards are contingent upon accurate responses. Yet,
findings from test-enhanced learning show that making errors can also be useful
for learning if those errors represent effortful retrieval attempts and are followed
by corrective feedback. Here, we used a challenging general knowledge task to
examine the effects of explicitly rewarding retrieval effort, defined as a semantically
plausible answer to a question (referenced to a semantic knowledge database www.
mangelslab.org/bknorms), regardless of response accuracy. In particular, we asked
whether intermittent rewards following effortful incorrect responses facilitated learning
from corrective feedback as measured by incidental learning outcomes on a 24–
48 h delayed retest. Given that effort-contingent extrinsic rewards represent the
intersection between an internal locus of control and competency, we compared
participants in this “Effort” group to three other groups in a between-subjects design:
a Luck group that framed rewards as related to participant-chosen lottery numbers
(reward with internal control, not competence-based), a random Award group that
framed rewards as computer generated (no control, not competence-based), and a
Control group with no reward, but matched on all other task features. Both men
and women in the Effort group showed increased self-reports of concentration and
positive feelings following the receipt of rewards, as well as subjective effort on the
retest, compared to the Control group. However, only women additionally exhibited
performance benefits of effort framing on error correction. These benefits were found
for both rewarded and non-rewarded trials, but only for correction of low confidence
errors, suggesting that effort-contingent rewards produced task-level changes in
motivation to learn less familiar information in women, rather than trial-level influences in
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encoding or consolidation. The Luck and Award groups did not demonstrate significant
motivational or behavioral benefits for either gender. These results suggest that both
reward context and gender are important factors contributing to the effectiveness of
rewards as tools to enhance learning from errors.
Keywords: reward, intrinsic, extrinsic, feedback, cognitive evaluation theory, testing effect, gender difference,
mastery achievement goals

INTRODUCTION

and this can subvert their sense of autonomy and shift the
perceived locus of control from internal to external factors (e.g.,
Lepper et al., 1973; Ryan, 1982; Ryan et al., 1983; Mueller
and Dweck, 1998). Likewise, intrinsic motivation is negatively
impacted when rewards are given just for “showing up” or for
completion regardless of performance because these decrease the
association of the reward with competence. Intrinsic motivation
can be maintained or increased, however, when rewards are
unexpected, are tied to an internal locus of control, and/or
provide positive information about competence. Therefore,
it is possible that intermittently rewarding individuals for
their competence regarding task engagement and completion,
regardless of performance outcomes — essentially rewarding
their “effort” to make a high quality response in a task even
if their attempt was unsuccessful — should be particularly
beneficial to a difficult declarative memory task that might
require sustained attention and/or where individuals might feel
particularly challenged.

“Learning is its own greatest reward.” This statement, credited
to the humanistic British writer William Hazlitt (1778–1830),
epitomizes a certain educational ideal, one that values intrinsic
rewards from the effort put into mastering new material,
regardless of the ultimate outcome measured by external
metrics of achievement. Indeed, decades of social cognitive and
educational research have shown that students who are motivated
to master material fare better with regard to overall learning,
particularly in the face of negative outcomes and setbacks, as
compared to when motivation is focused more on a desire
to prove one’s ability relative to others (Grolnick and Ryan,
1987; Henderson and Dweck, 1990). More specifically, within
the context of learning new factual information, the willingness
to engage effortfully with this material by making valid initial
retrieval attempts, even when errors may occur, has been
championed as superior to simply being told answers, or giving
answers that have little semantic relationship to the question
(e.g., testing-effects; error-based learning; Metcalfe, 2017; see
also Kluger and DeNisi, 1998). Given the apparent importance
of effortful engagement for learning, one question is whether
providing extrinsic rewards related to perceived engagement,
rather than outcome, can yield the same benefits for feedbackbased learning that has been shown for intrinsic mastery-oriented
mindsets (Mangels et al., 2006; Moser et al., 2011; Ochakovskaya,
2018). To this aim, the present study will focus on how
rewarding students for high-quality, but nonetheless incorrect
responses to a series of difficult general-knowledge questions may
facilitate the ability to encode corrective information and learn
from those mistakes.
Recent classroom field studies (Angrist et al., 2014; Levitt et al.,
2016a,b) and controlled laboratory experiments (Murayama and
Kuhbandner, 2011; Patil et al., 2016) have shown that the prospect
of attaining a monetary reward can be a useful motivator for
encoding new information in declarative memory, particularly
when that encoding depends on forming new associations rather
than simply memorizing individual items (Murty and Adcock,
2013; Stanek et al., 2019). Giving rewards for successful learning
can promote overall task engagement, as well as up-regulate
attention specifically to reward-relevant information (Wittmann
et al., 2005). However, Cognitive Evaluation Theory underscores
how the use of rewards to extrinsically motivate behavior
oftentimes leads to a paradoxical decrease in intrinsic motivation,
lessening the person’s natural inclinations to participate in the
task at hand (Deci, 1975; for meta-analyses see Deci et al.,
1999, 2001). Individuals who are rewarded for good performance
may feel their behavior is coerced by the reward contingencies,
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Study Design
Our examination of the influence of an “effort-contingent”
reward on feedback-based learning in declarative memory used
a test-feedback-retest paradigm that has been extensively studied
in our laboratory (Butterfield and Mangels, 2003; Mangels et al.,
2011, 2017, 2018; Whiteman and Mangels, 2016). In this general
paradigm, a trial begins with subjects generating an answer
to a general knowledge question, selected to be challenging
to that individual based on their knowledge level, and rating
their confidence in their answer. Entering this information
triggers presentation of feedback indicating what the correct
answer actually is (which simultaneously confirms the accuracy
or inaccuracy of their own retrieval attempt). Critically for
the present study, this feedback was followed by a rewardrelated stimulus that indicated whether the trial additionally
earned them a token toward lottery tickets that might earn
them additional monetary prizes at the end of the study. Later,
participants were given a surprise retest for all questions, both
those initially correct and incorrect, allowing us to operationalize
successful learning as the number of initially incorrect items
that were successfully corrected on the retest. Reward-earning
stimuli were presented occasionally (∼25–30% of all trials),
but equally often after both correct and incorrect answers,
and thus, are neither contingent on initial performance, nor
(because it was a surprise retest) on later memory, unlike in
many past studies (Adcock et al., 2006; Wittmann et al., 2011; but
see Mather and Schoeke, 2011; Murty and Adcock, 2013). We
were particularly interested in determining whether framing
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memory (Horvitz, 2000; Bunzeck et al., 2010). Here, the same
stimuli that signified rewards in the other groups were framed
simply as randomly appearing tokens. To ensure that participants
still attended to the appearance of these items, however, they
were told they would be rewarded at the end of the task for
maintaining an accurate count of these tokens (all participants
were asked to provide a token count at the end of a block of
trials, but only this group was rewarded for count accuracy).
The actual reward contingencies were equated across groups not
only with regard to quantity (∼25–30% of all trials), but also
with regard to the quality of the participants’ answer attempt
and general task effort. Only the instructional framing of the
contingencies on which these post-feedback stimuli appeared was
manipulated across groups.

rewards as “effort-contingent” influenced error correction
for either the rewarded incorrect trials specifically, or even
incorrect trials on the whole, compared to experimental
groups where rewards were not contingent on effort, or were
not given at all.
Rewards in the Effort group were explicitly described to
participants as contingent on the semantic quality of their answer
in terms of semantic proximity to the question and correct
answer, regardless of absolute accuracy. Thus, although there are
multiple ways to operationalize the motivational construct of
“effort” (e.g., Niv et al., 2006; Schunk et al., 2008), our definition
focuses on quality of the response (i.e., whether a teacher or
fellow student might consider that they “showed an effort” to
provide an educated response, even if it was incorrect), rather
than the quantity of physical or mental exertion needed by the
participant to provide this higher-quality answer (e.g., Wolf et al.,
1995; Wise and Kong, 2005; Manohar et al., 2017). We opted to
focus on answer quality in part because our extensive past use
of this general knowledge paradigm has allowed us to develop a
large database of questions and common answers1 from which
we can derive both the overall difficulty level of the question,
as well as a priori judgments about the quality associated with
participants’ incorrect responses (see section “Materials” for
judgment criteria). Specifically, in addition to the correct answer,
only those incorrect responses that matched a semantically
plausible incorrect response in the database were tagged as
eligible for reward. Additionally, we biased rewards toward the
more difficult items in our general knowledge question pool.
We acknowledge that high-quality answers for questions with
high overall accuracy rates (i.e., “easier” questions), may have
high retrieval fluency and can be answered quickly with little
retrieval effort on the part of the participant. On the other
hand, more difficult questions typically have a larger range of
possible answers, which increases retrieval difficulty. Thus, it
is these more difficult questions, where initial answers might
be associated with low confidence, where we expected that the
prospect of reward for an educated guess might yield the greatest
benefits to learners.
We attempted to isolate the mechanism underlying any
observed effects of the Effort group on learning by contrasting
it with two additional reward groups (Luck and Award), as well
as a non-reward control group. In the Luck group, participants
selected a set of “lucky numbers” at the outset of the experiment
and were told that a reward would be delivered if one of these
numbers matched a computer-generated number on a given trial
(see also Wittig et al., 1981; Schunk, 1985). These participants,
therefore, had some degree of internal control, although the
rewards did not provide any competency information. In the
Award group, participants were told that rewards would occur
randomly on computer-selected trials. Thus, while rewards were
presented, they did not speak to the participants’ competency
for the task, and by being attributed to a random event, the
locus of control was shifted away from the individual. Finally,
we introduced a Control group to address the basic impact of
the novelty and perceptual salience of the reward stimulus on
1

Study Hypotheses and Predictions
We predicted that framing rewards as effort-contingent would
result in increased intrinsic motivation to attend to the task and
in particular, to the corrective feedback, compared to the Control
group and the two non-competency-contingent reward groups
(Luck and Award). This would be evidenced by better incidental
learning of the correct answers, as revealed by performance
on the surprise retest, as well as higher self-reported taskmotivation and concentration. Additionally, as discussed in
greater detail below, the effort-contingent framing may affect
encoding task-wide or might be more specific only to those
question-answer trials that were rewarded, especially those with
lower initial response confidence because these require more
externally motivated effort for learning. We also explore whether
the influence of effort-contingent reward in a verbal declarative
memory task, such as used here, may vary across individuals on
the basis of gender and motivational predispositions.
As mentioned above, the effects of our reward manipulations
on successful incidental encoding of the correct answer might be
evidenced task-wide, affecting both rewarded and non-rewarded
trials, or might be greater for those trials that received a reward.
To the extent that the prospect of reward promotes overall
attention and task-engagement (i.e., proactive control; Locke and
Braver, 2008; Chiew and Braver, 2013, 2016; but see Kostandyan
et al., 2019), perhaps through tonic increases in dopamine levels
(Floresco et al., 2003; Lisman and Grace, 2005), we might
expect group differences in retest performance to be generalized
across all trial types. However, most reward paradigms, such
as the monetary incentive delay task, signal the possibility for
reward prior to the beginning of each trial (e.g., Knutson et al.,
2000; Adcock et al., 2006; for review see Krebs and Woldorff,
2017), thereby additionally potentiating transient levels of effort
at the trial-level. Additionally, the reward presentation itself
should elicit phasic increases in dopamine (Schultz, 1998, 2001;
Glimcher, 2011). In our task the reward is presented after the
memory-relevant information, making it is less clear how this
phasic increase might influence learning. Yet, updated reward
learning models suggest a potential “penumbra” effect by which
memory for other information presented within the same context
might similarly be enhanced despite being somewhat unrelated
to and temporally separated from with the reward itself (Wang
et al., 2010; Lisman et al., 2011; Redondo and Morris, 2011).

www.mangelslab.org/bknorms
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learning this verbal information, might respond differently than
men to a reward frame that is focused on effort. Therefore, our
analyses considered gender differences in retest performance and
looked for possible gender-by-group interaction effects as well.

Indeed, Murayama and Kitagami (2014) recently demonstrated a
reward memory enhancement effect for information that was not
only presented before the reward stimulus but was also part of a
separate task (Murayama and Kitagami, 2014). Thus, it is possible
that there will an additional memory enhancement specific to
rewarded trials.
We also considered how the confidence level the participants
had in their initial answer might interact with reward
enhancement. In previous studies with a similar paradigm, when
participants provide an incorrect answer with high confidence,
they are more likely to correct these items on the retest than
if they endorsed their answer with low confidence (Butterfield
and Metcalfe, 2001, 2006; Butterfield and Mangels, 2003). This
effect is due in part to the increase in attention associated
with the surprise of receiving negative performance feedback
(i.e., finding out they are wrong equates to a large negative
prediction error; see Butterfield and Mangels, 2003; Butterfield
and Metcalfe, 2006), and in part to the greater likelihood that
the participant will be familiar with the correct answer and
the associated semantic facilitation that this affords (Butterfield
and Mangels, 2003; Metcalfe and Finn, 2011; Sitzman et al.,
2015). To the extent that correction of high-confidence errors is
already strongly facilitated by these mechanisms, it may benefit
little from the addition of the reward context in comparison
to low-confidence errors. Additionally, low confidence errors
may be more likely to occur in domains that are of less
intrinsic interest to the participant, leaving them more malleable
to the influence of extrinsic rewards (Kang et al., 2009;
Gruber et al., 2014). For example, Murayama and Kuhbandner
(2011) demonstrated reward-related memory enhancement for
information that participants classified as “boring,” but not
for information they classified as interesting. Therefore, we
predicted that the general effect of reward context on overall
performance should be most apparent for trials endorsed
with low confidence.
Finally, the meaning and significance of a reward may
potentially vary across individuals on the basis of gender
and motivational predispositions (Shim and Ryan, 2005;
Spreckelmeyer et al., 2009; Martin-Soelch et al., 2011). Women
tend to exhibit better self-concepts than men in verbal domains
(Skaalvik and Skaalvik, 2004; for meta-analyses see Wilgenbusch
and Merrell, 1999; Huang, 2012) and self-concepts such
as perceived competence are predictive of academic success
(Miserandino, 1996). Moreover, some research suggests that
women have greater levels of intrinsic motivation for academic
learning more generally (Vallerand et al., 1992; but see Cokley
et al., 2001). Moreover, women frequently outperform men in
verbal and episodic memory tasks (Herlitz et al., 1997; Lewin
et al., 2001; for a review, see Herlitz and Rehnman, 2008).
Previous work in our lab has been consistent with these findings.
In two prior studies using a similar paradigm to the present
investigation, women tended to underperform relative to men
on the first test, which primarily taps semantic memory, but
outperformed men on error correction at the surprise retest,
which relies heavily on episodic memory for new associations
(Whiteman and Mangels, 2016; Mangels et al., 2018). Thus,
women, who may be inherently more motivated to engage with

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

MATERIALS AND METHODS
General Design Overview
In a between-subjects, test-feedback-surprise-retest design,
participants in four groups each answered 160 general
knowledge questions. Question difficulty was titrated to
achieve 50% accuracy at the first test. In all 4 groups, participants
reported their confidence after each response, which was
followed by the correct answer. Roughly 30% of responses
were rewarded, evenly split between correct and incorrect
trials. The framing of reward contingencies was manipulated
for each group: trial-specific reward stimuli either indicated
that the answer was deemed a "good effort" (Effort Group),
that the program has drawn one of the participants’ lucky
numbers chosen prior to the task (Luck Group), or that the
program has randomly selected the question for reward (Award
Group). In all conditions, the number of rewards received would
provide additional opportunities for post-test compensation.
For the Control group, there were no trial-specific rewards, but
participants were told that maintaining an accurate count of
the designated target symbol would provide opportunity for
additional post-test compensation (Control Group). Following
each block of 40 questions, participants self-reported level
of effort and various measures of affect as well as how many
rewards they had received in the previous block of trials.
A surprise re-test of all 160 questions was conducted 1–2 days
later, without reward.

Participants
One hundred and sixty adults (101 women) were recruited from
the University of Denver population and the surrounding
community. Our target sample size of 140 participants
(35/group) was based on prior studies we had conducted
with this test-retest paradigm and other motivational and/or
gender variables, where 20–35 participants were needed to
achieve a significant group difference in error correction
performance (Mangels et al., 2006, 2018; Ochakovskaya, 2018).
However, based on our previous studies using a similar test-retest
paradigm (Mangels et al., 2006; Whiteman and Mangels, 2016;
Ochakovskaya, 2018), recruitment exceeded our target by ∼15%
with the anticipation that some data would be unusable due to
either attrition, technical problems, or titration cutoffs etc.
Participants were 18–35 years of age (M = 21.06, SEM = 0.021),
native English speakers or fluent by 6-years-old and had normal
or corrected to normal vision and hearing. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of four study groups including three
rewarded groups (Effort, Luck, and Award) and a control group.
This study was carried out at the University of Denver in
accordance with the recommendations of the University of
Denver Institutional Review Board (DU IRB). The protocol was
approved by the DU IRB prior to participant recruitment. All
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subjects provided written informed consent in accordance with
the Declaration of Helsinki and were compensated at a rate of
either $10 per hour or course credit.
Data from thirteen participants were lost due either to failure
to complete the task (N = 1) or computer problems (N = 12). An
additional three participants were excluded for failure to meet the
titration target of 0.50 correct on the first test (performance <= 2
SD the sample mean; M = 0.4988, SD = 0.01). We removed four
additional participants (1 from Control, 1 from Effort, and 2 from
Luck) who were outliers based on having studentized deleted
residuals of greater than |2| and/or Cook’s distance values of
greater than 0.0277 (i.e., 4/sample size) on the second test.
Table 1 shows basic demographic information (gender, age,
education) of the final sample. We did not specifically attempt
to assign equal numbers of women and men to each group,
but rather randomly assigned students to group regardless of
gender. Despite more women than men participating overall, a
non-significant Pearson chi-square test of independence verified
that the gender ratios did not differ across groups, X 2 (3,
N = 140) = 2.67, p = 0.45. There were no gender or group
differences in participant age or years of education (all ps > 0.2).

reward-eligible, however, it had to be rated as such by a consensus
of 4–5 reviewers. Answers receiving reward-eligible votes by 3 or
fewer raters were categorized as reward-ineligible. For example,
if a subject answered a question asking for the name of an
animal with “red,” this would not be considered a reward-eligible
response. In some cases, an answer that otherwise matched the
question keywords/correct response may still not be considered
of sufficient quality to be reward-eligible. For example, “Smith” is
a valid answer to any question asking for a proper name, however,
because it is so common, is also unlikely to be a valid attempt to
answer the question.
Additionally, although answers to all questions in the database
were rated for reward-eligibility in this manner, at the task level,
rewards/tokens were only presented on a subset of the more
difficult questions. Rewards were not administered for the easiest
quartile of the database (i.e., 104 easiest questions) regardless of
whether a correct or reward-eligible answer was given. Exclusion
of the easiest questions from reward eligibility served to support
the perception of relationship between rewards and retrieval
effort. The more difficult questions also had a larger base of
incorrect answers that were rated as eligible for reward; questions
with high accuracy rates had correspondingly few incorrect
answers in the database.

Materials
The task utilized 414 questions from the B-KNorms database
of general knowledge questions and responses2 . The questions
in this database span a range of academic domains (history,
literature, geography, etc.), and each question has a unique
correct answer consisting of a single word, 3–12 characters long.
The number of respondents to each question varied, but was
211 on average (min = 63, max = 583). The proportion of
respondents giving the correct answer to a question provides a
normative accuracy score (average accuracy across all database
questions = 0.33). Additionally, the database provides a full list
of all unique incorrect responses to each question (mean = 30
incorrect responses, min = 5, max = 79), as well as the
proportion of responders who gave each of these unique
incorrect responses. These incorrect answers varied in the degree
to which they matched the correct answer and/or keywords
in the question.
For the purpose of this study, the reward eligibility of answers
in this database were rated by five independent raters, who
based their judgment on whether the answer was both consistent
with the content category of the question and constituted a
quality response. By default, all correct responses were rated as
reward-eligible. For an incorrect answer to be categorized as
2

Design and Procedure
Overall Study Design
We employed a 2-day test-retest design with a delay interval
of 1 or 2 days, balancing availability and delay intervals across
groups. Prior to the start of the first test on Day 1, participants
completed a series of computerized pre-test questionnaires
consisting of demographic questions, followed by validated
motivation questionnaires (e.g., Work Preference Inventory,
Achievement Goals Questionnaire; see Supplementary Section
“S1. Questionnaires”). Then they were randomly assigned to
one of the four groups (Control, Award, Luck, Effort) and
presented with 160 questions across 4 blocks of 40 questions
each. At the end of each block, participants reported the
number of reward stimuli they had seen (via free-response
text box) and provided ratings of self-reported concentration,
motivation, perceived difficulty and performance, and affective
appraisals of the accuracy and reward feedbacks using a 7-point
Likert scale. They also completed a motivation questionnaire
at the end of the first test (see Supplementary Section
“S1. Questionnaires”).
Throughout the task, the testing program selected questions
based on an algorithm designed to titrate initial performance

www.mangelslab.org/bknorms

TABLE 1 | Sample characteristics.
n

Men

Women

Age men

Age women

Yrs. school men

Yrs. school women

Control

35

12

23

20.33 (1.66)

21.52 (3.36)

15.42 (1.42)

14.89 (1.58)

Effort

35

15

20

20.87 (3.02)

20.70 (2.82)

15.13 (1.36)

15.40 (1.52)

Luck

34

15

19

21.20 (2.94)

20.53 (1.53)

15.57 (1.7)

14.87 (1.53)

Award

36

10

26

21.70 (2.81)

21.42 (2.4)

15.45 (1.39)

15.40 (1.73)

Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
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whether to provide a reward based on past reward history with
the goal of keeping overall reward probability at 0.30, with an
equal probability following both correct and incorrect answers.
Responses for which no match could be found in the database
were automatically ineligible for reward. Although the database
is fairly comprehensive, we cannot rule out the possibility that
some semantically plausible incorrect answers would not be
found in the database and thus, deemed ineligible for reward on
that basis rather than because they were poor matches for the
question entity. However, not all reward-eligible responses in the
database were rewarded either, so this should not have changed
the subjective experience of the participant.
The feedback sequence began with a 1 s fixation crosshair
followed by the accuracy feedback in which the correct answer
was displayed for 2 s (green text / high tone for correct
answers, red text / low tone for incorrect answers). Following
another 1 s fixation, participants were presented with reward
feedback. In order to control for the perceptual salience of the
reward, two symbols (counterbalanced across participants) were
used for both reward and non-reward feedback. Regardless of
symbol type (open or closed circle), rewards were always coupled
with a higher frequency tone and non-rewards with a lower
frequency tone.

toward a cumulative accuracy level of 0.50. Titration was
employed in order to equate overall accuracy and reward
frequencies for each subject regardless of group. A target of 0.50
correct was selected as it provided an equal number of correct
and incorrect responses for analysis and ensured that participants
found the task challenging overall.
After attempting to answer each question, a series of
feedback and reward outcomes were presented (see section
“Trial sequence” for details). The adaptive computer program
attempted to distribute rewards equally across the four test
blocks, and within block, equally across correct and incorrect
responses, while limiting rewards from appearing twice in a
row. The target reward schedule was 12 rewards per block (6
correct, 6 incorrect), for a total of 24 correct and 24 incorrect
rewarded trials across the task, which was equivalent to a 0.30
probability of reward. Provided the participant’s response was
reward-eligible, the testing program attempted to reach this target
reward schedule by applying an algorithm that iteratively adapted
the probability of a reward based on the accuracy of the response
and the total number of rewards previously administered in the
given block of questions.
On Day 2 of testing, participants were given a surprise
retest of all of the questions from Day 1. The block order
was preserved from the first test, but question order within
block was randomized. The second test contained no titration
(performance was free to vary), nor reward feedback, nor postblock questions. At the conclusion of the retest, participants
read a debriefing statement and then completed a short series
of debriefing questions which asked about the participants’
perceived difficulty, level of effort, performance relative to others
and degree to which the participants’ expected and/or studied for
the surprise retest on a 9-point Likert scale. We then conducted a
lottery for each participant and awarded any winning participants
with money ($5, $15, and/or $25) in addition to their regular
compensation for participation (see Supplementary Section “S2.
Lottery Parameters” for details of lottery parameters).

Instructions
General Instructions
Pre-recorded instructions indicated that the trivia game was
designed to be challenging and would adjust the difficulty of
questions based on performance on prior questions but did
not inform participants of the 0.50 titration target. Participants
were shown sample questions and given examples of low-quality
(i.e., reward ineligible) and high-quality (i.e., reward eligible)
answers. The instructions for all groups except the control also
indicated that the program would occasionally give rewards in the
form of lottery tickets and were shown examples of the reward
feedback. To attempt to equate the reward groups in terms of
general motivation, all four instructions emphasized that reward
opportunities would occur more often for questions that “exceed
a certain level of difficulty.” In the Control group, they were told
that the target stimulus would occur more often for these more
difficult questions.

Trial Sequence
For each question, participants had 3 min to type and submit
their one-word response (see Figure 1). A spell-checker was used
to assist participants in correcting any misspelled words before
they made their final response submission (see Supplementary
Section “S3. Participant Response Spelling Check” for spellchecker rules). This was done to facilitate automated matching
of the subject’s answers with the database answers for subsequent
determination of reward eligibility by the program. Except for
trials where no answer was given within the 3-min time limit
(i.e., omit trials), the participant then rated their confidence
in their response on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (“sure
wrong”) to 7 (“sure right”) immediately following each question.
Omit trials skipped the confidence rating and went directly
to feedback presentation. The testing program then compared
the participant’s response to the correct answer to determine
what type of accuracy feedback to provide (i.e., negative or
positive feedback).
If the response was reward-eligible (see section “Materials” for
how eligibility was defined), the program would then determine

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

Group Framing Instructions
The specific instructions varied across the four groups in the
degree to which they suggested participants had control over
the reward outcomes, even though across all groups the testing
program behaved identically in terms of reward frequency and
eligibility criteria.
In the Effort group, the instructions emphasized that
participants would be more likely to earn rewards when they
made a “good effort” to provide a correct response. In the Luck
group, participants selected 25 “lucky numbers” before the test
using a Keno-style board showing numbers up to 100 and were
told that the reward symbols appeared when the computer had
randomly drawn one of their “lucky numbers.” In the Award
group, participants were told that reward symbols appeared when
the question number matched a number “randomly generated
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FIGURE 1 | First-test trial structure. At the start of each trial, the participant is shown a question and types their answer in a blank space below. In this example, the
answer entered is ARISTOTLE, which is incorrect, but reward-eligible because it is a plausible, semantically-relevant response. After the answer is entered, the
participant would be prompted to rate their confidence in their answer’s accuracy on a 7-point scale (1 = sure wrong, 7 = sure right). Then, after a 1 s fixation point to
orient attention to the center of the screen, the correct answer would appear for 2 s, either in red if their initial answer was incorrect, as in this example, or in green if
it was correct. This accuracy/learning feedback is then followed by another 1 s fixation. Then, because this example shows a reward-eligible answer, the final
stimulus would be either reward or no-reward feedback, assuming that this trial occurred in any of the three rewarded groups (in the Control group these stimuli
function as target or non-target symbols to be counted). Both of these reward options would also have been possible if the participant had initially provided the
correct answer (i.e., PLATO). However, if the participant had given an incorrect response that showed little effort and thus, was reward ineligible (e.g., SMITH or IDK),
only non-reward feedback would have been possible as the final trial stimulus.

by the computer.” Incorrect answers could still be followed by
a reward; however, they were told that the random number
generator would only be triggered on more difficult questions (see
Supplementary Section “S4. Group-Specific Instructions” for
verbatim instructions).
Finally, in the Control group, participants counted the number
of target stimuli (whichever was more infrequent) and reported
this number at the end of each block. They were told that “the
closer your answer is to the actual number displayed, the more
lottery tickets you will be given.” As with the other groups, the
target stimulus could follow both incorrect and correct responses
and was more likely to occur for more difficult questions. As a
manipulation check, we expected that participants in the Control
group would maintain more accurate reward stimulus counts,
given that they were directly incentivized to do so, and this was
indeed the case (see Supplementary Section “S5. Post-block
Reward Stimulus Count”).

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

Data Analytic Strategy
Our primary behavioral measures were overall retest
performance and error correction at retest. For each behavioral
measure, we conducted a separate analysis of variance (ANOVA)
including both group and gender as between-subject factors. In
terms of error correction, we further explored trial-level learning
performance with separate ANOVAs for rewarded versus nonrewarded items and for high versus low confidence items. For
the confidence analysis, we first conducted a repeated-measures
ANOVA with the confidence included as a within-subjects factor
and group and gender as between-subjects factors.
For post-block and debriefing questions, we averaged
responses for each question across blocks and conducted a 4
(group) by 2 (gender) multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA).
Rank transformations were performed prior to the analysis as
the distributions of some responses were sufficiently non-normal
(skewness or kurtosis > |3|). Each subscale measure was included
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An analysis focusing on the error correction rates followed
a similar pattern. Neither of the main effects of group nor
gender on the proportion of errors corrected were significant
(all Fs < 0.31, ps > 0.57, ηp2 s < 0.01), however, there was
a marginally significant interaction between group and gender,
F(3, 132) = 2.5, p = 0.063, ηp2 < 0.054. Post hoc comparisons
indicated that women in the Effort group (M = 0.81, SD = 0.06)
corrected a significantly higher proportion of errors at retest
than men in the same group (M = 0.74, SD = 0.11, p = 0.012)
and corrected a marginally higher proportion than women
in the Control group (M = 0.75, SD = 0.10, p = 0.083)
(see Figure 2B).
Unfortunately, our samples were unmatched along the
dimension of gender, as women outnumbered men across
all groups. Therefore, the interaction effects were somewhat
underpowered (observed power = 0.64 for overall retest
performance and = 0.61 for proportion of errors corrected).
In order to affirm that the lack of an observed effect in men
was not due to an insufficient number of male participants, we
estimated Bayesian factors for each null hypothesis using JASP
software (JASP Team, 2018). A Bayesian factor (BF01 ) of the
null for the effect of group for men was 5.18 for overall retest
performance and was 5.06 for the proportion of errors corrected.
These results suggest that both of the null hypotheses were over
5 times stronger than the alternatives (Jarosz and Wiley, 2014).
Therefore, there was substantial support that the absence of an
effect for men was not merely due to a lack of power.

as a separate dependent variable. For the post-block questions
and debriefing questions, each separate question was treated as
a unique dependent variable.
Across each of these analyses, we set the criterion for
significance as the conventional alpha level of p = 0.05. Main
effects or interactions with an alpha level greater than 0.05 but less
than 0.1 were considered marginal, but explored and reported as
trends. Significant and marginal effects were further investigated
by carrying out post hoc tests using the Bonferroni procedure for
corrections for multiple comparisons.

RESULTS
Retest Performance and Error
Correction
Overall Performance
Prior to conducting these analyses, we established that first-test
factors (first-test accuracy, the number of hours of delay between
the first and second tests, the total number of reward/target
stimuli shown, and the average confidence for rewarded and
non-rewarded trials as a function of group and gender) that
might influence retest performance had been successfully equated
across groups and genders (see Supplementary Section “S6.
First-Test Measures”).
The predicted main effect of group on overall retest
performance was not significant, nor was there a main effect
of gender (all Fs < 0.41, ps > 0.74, ηp2 s < 0.01). However,
there was a significant interaction between group and gender,
F(3, 132) = 2.68, p = 0.05, ηp2 = 0.057. Post hoc comparisons
indicated that women in the Effort group (M = 0.90, SD = 0.04)
had significantly higher overall retest scores than men in the
same group (M = 0.86, SD = 0.06, p = 0.02), as well as
women in the Control group (M = 0.86, SD = 0.06, p = 0.029)
(see Figure 2A). No other comparisons between groups were
significant in men or women.

Error Correction: Rewarded vs. Non-rewarded Errors
Given that total error correction includes both the correction of
rewarded and non-rewarded errors, we conducted an additional
analysis to determine whether the effects observed in the overall
error correction analysis were primarily driven by errors that
were rewarded, or extended equally to those that were not.
Because the total number of non-rewarded errors included
responses that were eligible for reward (∼58% of non-rewarded

FIGURE 2 | Retest performance measures. (A) Overall accuracy at retest (includes all first-test items, regardless of initial accuracy). (B) Proportion of first-test errors
that were corrected at retest. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean (SEM).
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response (i.e., greater for higher confidence errors; Butterfield
and Metcalfe, 2001). Because participants may calibrate their
confidence differently along the scale, we defined higher and
lower confidence errors for each participant individually, based
on a median split of their confidence ratings for incorrect
responses3 (Median confidence value: Mode = 4, M = 4.1,
SD = 0.88; see also Mangels et al., 2006). Median confidence
values did not systematically differ across groups or gender
(all Fs < 1, ps > 0.33, ηp2 s < 0.007), and indeed overall
metacognitive sensitivity was also similar across groups at
both the initial test and retest (see Supplementary Section
“S7. Metacognitive Sensitivity”). Having assured that groups
were matched on these overall confidence factors, we then
compared error correction rates with confidence (high, low)
as a within-subjects factor, alongside group and gender as
between-subjects factors.4
As shown in the lower panels of Figure 3, participants
corrected significantly more high confidence errors than low
confidence errors overall, F(1, 132) = 82.02, p < 0.001,
ηp2 = 0.383. This analysis also included the previously reported
marginally significant overall group x gender interaction on
error correction, F(3, 132) = 2.13, p = 0.099, ηp2 = 0.046 (see
also section “Overall performance”), but did not find any other
significant or marginal main effects or interactions (all Fs < 0.58,
ps > 0.63, ηp2 s < 0.67). Nonetheless, given that there may be
somewhat of a ceiling effect with respect to the correction of
high confidence items, and we had an a priori prediction that the
benefits conferred by reward framing might be greater for the low
confidence errors, we explored the effects of gender and group at
each confidence level separately. A univariate ANOVA conducted
on high confidence errors alone found no significant or marginal
effects of group and/or gender (Fs < 1.15, ps > 0.33, ηp2 s < 0.03;
Figure 3C). However, for low confidence errors, we once again
observed the marginal interaction between group and gender,
F(3, 132) = 2.18, p = 0.093, ηp2 = 0.047 (Figure 3D). Further
post hoc exploration of this effect indicated that women in the
Effort group corrected significantly more low confidence errors
(M = 0.80, SD = 0.07) than men in the Effort group (M = 0.71,
SD = 0.13, p = 0.016) and marginally more errors than women
in the Control group (M = 0.72, SD = 0.11, p = 0.07). No other
significant or marginal effects of group and/or gender were found
for the proportion of low confidence errors corrected (Fs < 0.3,
ps > 0.86, ηp2 s < 0.01).

errors) as well as lower-quality ineligible responses (∼42% of
non-rewarded errors), we conducted two analyses. In the first, we
directly compared error correction rates for rewarded and nonrewarded trials as a function of group and gender, and thus, opted
to only include reward-eligible non-rewarded responses. Rewardeligible non-rewarded trials are more directly comparable to the
rewarded trials on dimensions of answer quality and domain
familiarity (i.e., greater domain familiarity for reward eligible
trials). In the second analysis, we conducted analyses on rewarded
and non-rewarded trials separately, which allowed us to combine
reward-eligible and reward-ineligible trials in our analysis of
non-rewarded trials, given that both trial types represent an
opportunity for error correction. This separate analysis also
minimizes any concerns regarding the unequal number of
rewarded and non-rewarded trials.
When directly comparing rewarded and reward-eligible
non-rewarded trials, we found no significant main effects or
interactions (all Fs < 1.7, ps > 0.2, ηp2 s < 0.03). Thus,
not only did this analysis show that our reward manipulation
had no differential trial-level effects across rewarded and nonrewarded trials, but the necessary exclusion of reward-ineligible
trials appeared to reduce the magnitude of overall benefits of
the Effort group on women’s error correction. Indeed, when
separately analyzing rewarded trials and all non-rewarded trials
(i.e., allowing inclusion of both reward-eligible and rewardineligible trials), we now found that for non-rewarded trials,
although no main effects were observed (all Fs < 0.4, ps > 0.75,
ηp2 s < 0.01), a trend toward an interaction between group and
gender emerged, F(3, 132) = 291, p < 0.096, ηp2 = 0.047. Post
hoc comparisons of these non-rewarded errors demonstrated
a pattern identical to that seen for overall errors (see section
“Overall Performance”). Specifically, women in the Effort group
corrected significantly more non-rewarded errors (M = 0.81,
SD = 0.06) than both men in the Effort group (M = 0.74,
SD = 0.13, p = 0.039) and women in the Control group (M = 0.73,
SD = 0.11, p = 0.027). A similar pattern was found when analyzing
rewarded trials alone. Although there were no significant main
effects (all Fs < 1.2, ps > 0.31, ηp2 s < 0.03), there was a
marginally significant interaction between group and gender, F(3,
132) = 2.35, p = 0.076, ηp2 = 0.051. Post hoc exploration of this
interaction confirmed that women in the Effort group (M = 0.82,
SD = 0.09) corrected significantly more rewarded errors than men
in the same group (M = 0.72, SD = 0.12, p = 0.011), although the
difference between women in the Effort and Control groups did
not reach significance.
Taken together, these analyses provide little evidence that the
presentation of a reward-related stimulus after the feedback has
a circumscribed trial-level effect on encoding of that particular
learning opportunity. Rather to the extent that women benefitted
when the task was framed as rewarding effortful responses, that
benefit appeared to extend even to trials where no reward was
presented, and regardless of whether the answer on that trial was
reward-eligible or not.

Post-block/Post-test Questions
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for all post-block and posttest questions. Data was missing from one subject in the Effort
group for all post-block questions and from 9 participants (3
from the Control group and 2 from each of the other groups)
for each of the post-test questions. The data loss was due to
scripting errors with our testing and questionnaire programs,
3

The median confidence score was included either in the higher confidence or
lower confidence bin depending on which gave better balance with respect to the
number of higher and lower confidence trials in the analysis.
4
Because higher confidence errors were relatively rare, even when defined by a
median split procedure, we did not have sufficient power to further separate high
and low confidence errors into rewarded and non-rewarded subcategories.

Error Correction: High- vs. Low-Confidence Errors
We also predicted that error remediation might vary depending
on the participant’s initial confidence in their erroneous
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FIGURE 3 | Trial-level analyses of error correction. Proportion of errors corrected on trials in which (A) a reward was received and (B) no reward was received
(non-rewarded errors include both reward-eligible and ineligible trials). Proportion of errors corrected for trials endorsed either with (C) high confidence or (D) low
confidence. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean (SEM).

and not due to the participants declining to respond. The
analyses below include the remaining participants (139 postblock; 131 post-test).

Post-test Subjective Experience
Similar to the post-block questions, a MANOVA of the questions
asked after the retest revealed a significant effect of group, Pillai’s
Trace = 0.2, F(15, 363) = 1.72, p = 0.045, ηp2 = 0.067, but no main
effect of gender or group by gender interaction (All, Pillai’s Trace
<0.05, Fs < 1.0, ps > 0.5, ηp2 s < 0.04). Univariate tests indicated
that significant group differences were only found for subjective
reports of effort, F(3, 123) = 2.81, p = 0.042, ηp2 = 0.064. Post hoc
comparisons further indicated participants in the Effort group
reported giving significantly higher levels of effort on the retest
than participants in the Control group (see Table 2). No other
mean differences between groups were significant.

Post-block Subjective Experience
Across all post-block questions, the MANOVA revealed a
marginal effect of group, Pillai’s Trace = 0.254, F(24, 360) = 1.46,
p = 0.078, ηp2 = 0.085, but no effect of gender or group by
gender interaction (Fs < 1.6, ps > 0.15, ηp2 < 0.09). When
we explored the marginal effect of group further, univariate
tests revealed significant group differences in concentration
F(3,131) = 5.78, p = 0.001, ηp2 = 0.117, perceived performance,
F(3,131) = 2.73, p = 0.046, ηp2 = 0.059, and positive affect
following rewards F(3,131) = 4.73, p = 0.006, ηp2 = 0.091.
Following up these findings with post hoc comparisons, we
found that, regardless of gender, participants in the Effort group
reported significantly higher levels of concentration, perceived
performance, and positive affect upon reward receipt compared
to the Award group, and higher levels of concentration and
positive affect than the Control group (see Table 2). No other
comparisons were significant.
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DISCUSSION
The present study was interested in testing a fundamental
question relevant to the intersection of education and cognitive
psychology: can explicit rewards for meaningful attempts at
knowledge retrieval that nonetheless lead to wrong answers,
ultimately facilitate learning of the right answer? There is
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TABLE 2 | Post-Block (first test) and Post-Retest Questions.
Men
Post-Block

Control

Effort

Luck

Women
Award

Control

Effort

Luck

Award

Post Hoc Comparisons

Ability to Concentrate

4.9 (0.9)

5.7 (1.0)

5.2 (1.7)

4.3(1.9)

4.9(1.3)

6.0(1.0)

5.4 (1.2)

5.1 (1.2)

E > C∗∗ , E > A∗∗

Motivation to Perform Well

5.8 (1.1)

6.2 (0.7)

5.2 (1.8)

5.3 (2.1)

5.5 (1.1)

6.2 (0.7)

5.9 (0.8)

5.7 (1.1)

n.s.

Question Difficulty

4.6 (0.5)

4.7 (0.8)

4.5 (1.3)

4.1 (1.5)

4.7 (0.7)

4.6 (0.7)

4.6 (0.7)

4.8 (0.8)

n.s.

Performance Level

4.0 (0.7)

4.3 (0.8)

3.6 (1.1)

3.4 (1.5)

3.5 (0.9)

4.1 (0.8)

3.8 (0.7)

3.5 (0.8)

E > A∗

Positive Affect when Correct

5.8 (0.9)

5.8 (0.7)

5.4 (1.7)

5.1 (2.0)

5.8 (0.8)

6.1 (0.8)

5.6 (1.0)

5.8 (0.9)

n.s.

Negative Affect when Wrong

2.8 (1.0)

3.2 (1.1)

2.8 (1.0)

2.5 (1.2)

3.0 (0.9)

3.0 (0.6)

3.2 (0.7)

3.0 (0.8)

n.s.

Positive Affect when Rewarded

5.3 (0.9)

6.0 (0.9)

5.6 (0.8)

5.0 (1.4)

5.2 (1.1)

5.9 (0.8)

5.4 (0.9)

5.5 (1.0)

E > C∗∗ , E > A∗

Negative Affect when Not Rewarded

3.7 (0.6)

3.5 (0.9)

3.5 (0.6)

3.3 (0.8)

3.5 (0.8)

3.1 (0.8)

3.7 (0.5)

3.4 (0.7)

n.s.

Trying Hard (Effort)

5.7 (2.3)

6.6 (2.6)

6.9 (2.0)

6.3 (2.2)

6.0 (1.7)

7.3 (2.1)

7.0 (1.4)

6.5 (2.1)

E > C∗

Question Difficulty

2.0 (1.2)

2.3 (1.3)

2.4 (0.9)

2.0 (1.2)

2.6 (1.6)

2.4 (1.5)

3.3 (1.6)

2.4 (1.0)

n.s.

Performance Relative to Others

6.5 (1.2)

6.9 (1.2)

7.5 (1.3)

7.3 (1.3)

6.8 (1.3)

6.9 (1.4)

7.2 (1.1)

6.6 (1.6)

n.s.

Expected Retest

2.5 (2.4)

1.6 (1.4)

1.9 (1.7)

2.6 (2.7)

2.3 (2.0)

1.8 (1.9)

1.8 (1.5)

1.8 (1.9)

n.s.

Deliberately Studied Between Tests

1.5 (0.7)

1.5 (0.7)

1.7 (1.6)

2.1 (2.2)

1.4 (1.0)

2.1 (2.1)

1.6 (1.2)

2.0 (1.9)

n.s.

Post-Retest

Mean ratings are shown with standard deviations in parentheses. Post-Block ratings were collected using a 7-point Likert scale. Although we tailored the exact wording
of each scale to the concept being questioned, for all items except the affect questions, the low end of the scale (1) corresponded to the lowest level of that concept (i.e.,
“not able to concentrate at all,” “not at all motivated,” “questions not at all difficult/very easy,” “performed very poorly”), whereas the high end of the scale (7) corresponded
to the highest level of that concept (i.e., “concentrated very well,” “highly motivated,” “questions very difficult,” “performance was excellent”), and the middle value (4)
corresponded to a “moderate” level of each concept. For the affect-oriented questions, however, the low end of the scale always corresponded to negative affect (i.e.,
“very upset”) and the high end of the scale to positive affect (i.e., “very happy”), with the middle value representing “indifference,” regardless of whether the question asked
about positive or negative affect. All Post-Retest ratings were collected using the same 9-point Likert scale (1 = “not at all”, 5 = “somewhat”, 9 = “extremely”), with the
exception of the question about performance (relative to peers), which was scaled from 1 = “much worse” to 9 = “much better,” with 4 = “about the same”). All significant
values are Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons. Significant post hoc tests are indicated with (∗ ) where ∗ = p < 0.05 and ∗∗ = p < 0.01. Multivariate tests and
post hoc tests for Post-Block and Post-Retest Questions were conducted on rank transformed data.Non-transformed means and standard deviations are reported in the
table. For Post Hoc Comparisons, groups are indicated by first initial (C = Control, E = Effort, L = Luck, A = Award).

We found some support for our predictions, but this
support was limited to women, and statistically strongest when
considering retest performance for all items, rather than the
correction of initial errors. Specifically, women in the Effort
group significantly outperformed women in the Control group
in terms of overall retest performance. They also outperformed
men in the Effort group, who showed no evidence of benefit
from any type of reward as a group. Similar patterns were
found when focusing our analysis only on correction of initial
errors. However, although the difference between women in
the Effort and Control groups was on average ∼6%, which
equates to a difference of about 4–5 items, this difference was
only statistically marginal likely due to the greater variability
in error correction performance than overall performance.
In both analyses, women’s retest performance in the Luck
and Award groups was not statistically distinguishable from
the Effort or Control groups, suggesting that neither internal
control alone nor reward in isolation accounted wholly for
the influence of the effort-contingent framing on women’s
performance. Rather, it appears that the combination of these
factors was necessary to achieve the full benefits observed
for this group. However, we cannot rule out that there
was some additional factor in this group, not controlled for
by the comparison groups, which also contributed to its
learning benefits.
Additionally, in considering why the effects of the Effort group
on overall retest performance might have been more statistically

substantial research showing that active testing yields better
learning outcomes compared to passive review (Hogan and
Kintsch, 1971; McDaniel et al., 2007), yet we know of no
previous research that has specifically examined the effects
of explicitly rewarding a student for retrieval attempts based
on their answer quality, which we define here as evidence
of retrieval “effort.” Likewise, although a number of recent
studies have examined the effects of performance-contingent
rewards on encoding in declarative memory (e.g., Murty and
Adcock, 2013; Miendlarzewska et al., 2016), none as of yet
have explored the circumstances under which such effortcontingent rewards might facilitate error remediation. Drawing
on Cognitive Evaluation Theory (CET; Deci, 1975), we predicted
that rewards tied to a student’s self-determined attempts to
engage meaningfully with the initial retrieval phase of a
general knowledge task (i.e., Effort group) would be particularly
beneficial in facilitating incidental encoding of correct answer
feedback, as demonstrated on a later surprise retest for this
information. To tease apart the cognitive components of any
observed benefit of these effort-contingent rewards, we compared
the Effort group to a Luck group, where participants were
told that their potential for reward was tied to some degree
of choice (internal control), but not to answer competence, an
Award group where rewards were given randomly (related to
neither internal control, nor competence), and a Control group
designed to control for the basic novelty/perceptual salience of
the reward stimuli.
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Additionally, to inform our understanding of the potential
mechanisms underlying any observed framing effects, we
examined the effects of reward at the trial-level by comparing
the proportion of rewarded and non-rewarded errors corrected at
retest. Based on research supporting the dopaminergic memory
consolidation process (e.g., Murayama and Kuhbandner, 2011;
Shigemune et al., 2013; Murayama and Kitagami, 2014), we had
anticipated that rewarded errors might be corrected more often
than non-rewarded errors. However, the promise of extrinsic
rewards may also increase general motivation toward the task as a
whole conferring an overall benefit of reward framing as opposed
to benefitting specific trial types (Locke and Braver, 2008; but see
Kostandyan et al., 2019). In support of a general motivation effect,
we found no evidence of differentially greater error correction for
rewarded compared to non-rewarded trials either overall or as
a function of framing or gender. Indeed, further exploration of
framing and gender effects within rewarded and non-rewarded
trials separately found that effort-contingent framing benefitted
the error correction of women significantly more than men
for both rewarded and non-rewarded trials (at least when both
reward eligible and ineligible trials were considered together). If
anything, the effect of framing rewards as effort-contingent was
more statistically robust for women on these non-rewarded trials,
given that it was only for these trials that the Effort and Control
groups differed significantly from each other. This finding is also
broadly consistent with our previous findings with respect to
low-confidence errors. Insofar as our effort manipulation was
successful in motivating overall task engagement, this may have
facilitated greater attention to corrective feedback for those items
with little intrinsic salience, including non-rewarded trials and
trials with low initial confidence.

robust, compared to error correction alone, we note that overall
retest performance includes both the correction of first-test
errors as well as maintenance of initially accurate responses
(∼50% of first-test trials), some of which the participant likely
knew confidently and others for which they may have been
guessing or were less certain. For women in the Effort group,
the reward framing may have both facilitated the learning from
feedback on initially incorrect responses, as well as reinforced
the encoding of correct answers. Although lower confidence
correct responses may have been particularly sensitive to reward
reinforcement, they are typically relatively few in number,
which precludes systematic analysis. However, a larger range
of confidence values for initial errors permitted analysis of the
relationship between reward framing, gender and initial response
confidence in relation to error remediation specifically, which
we discuss below.
An exploratory analysis examining the effects of reward
framing and gender on error remediation for low- and highconfidence errors separately suggested that any benefits of
the Effort group experienced by women were primarily
driven by the enhanced remediation of low-confidence
errors. Although high-confidence errors were corrected
overwhelmingly more often than low-confidence errors
regardless of gender, replicating the hypercorrection effect
(e.g., Butterfield and Metcalfe, 2001, 2006; Butterfield and
Mangels, 2003), error correction of these items did not appear
to be modulated further by reward framing. The relative rarity
of high-confidence errors already up-regulates attention to
learning more than their low-confidence counterparts (e.g.,
Butterfield and Mangels, 2003; Butterfield and Metcalfe,
2006), and correct answer feedback is more likely to benefit
from processing fluency associated with the greater domain
familiarity associated with these types of errors (Unkelbach
and Greifeneder, 2013). Thus, it was not unexpected that
any influence of reward on attention would have relatively
little additional effect. However, for feedback following lowconfidence errors, which have neither the intrinsic qualities
of surprise nor semantic fluency, an effort-contingent
framing resulted in significantly greater error correction
for women compared to men, and marginally greater error
correction when comparing women in the Effort and Control
groups directly.
These results mirror the overall error correction findings
discussed above (i.e., when all items were considered, regardless
of confidence) and is potentially consistent with previous
studies (Murayama and Kuhbandner, 2011) where extrinsic
rewards appear to have the greatest effect on learning when the
information to-be-learned is of low intrinsic interest. Current
models of reward modulation in declarative memory suggest
that positive rewards particularly benefit associative encoding
(for review see Murty and Adcock, 2013; Miendlarzewska
et al., 2016; Chiew and Adcock, 2019). Low-confidence error
correction could be construed as placing greater demands
on episodic encoding of new question-answer associations
compared to high-confidence errors whose greater domain
familiarity could capitalize more on activation of pre-existing
semantic relationships.

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

Limitations and Future Directions
It was somewhat surprising that effort-contingent reward
framing conferred a retest performance advantage for women
only, given that both women and men in this group reported
greater task concentration in general, and more positive feelings
about rewards in particular, than participants in either the Award
or Control groups. Both women and men in the Effort group
also self-reported giving greater effort on the retest compared
to the Control group. These self-report measures would suggest
that both men and women in the Effort group felt more engaged
with the task than participants in the other groups, yet only
women demonstrated the positive effects of this engagement
in terms of subsequent memory. Although interpretation of
these gender differences should be made with caution given
the differences in sample sizes, our analyses indicated that it is
unlikely that increasing this sample would yield effects for men
that simply mirrored those of women. Moreover, across all of
our analyses the mean scores for men in the Effort group were
lower than men in any other framing group whereas the scores
for women in the Effort group were higher than women in any
other framing group.
One possibility is that these gender-specific performance
differences may be a result of the general “goodness of
fit” between our Effort group and the intrinsic academic
goals more typically ascribed to women (Vallerand, 1989;
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Finally, to the extent that beneficial effects of rewards for effort
were observed in women, it is not clear how long lasting these
effects might be. Our retest occurred after a 24–48 h period, but it
is unknown whether the influence of this reward would persist
over the longer delays most relevant to classroom learning. It
would also be interesting to consider whether rewards for effort
might be particularly beneficial when learning requires sustained
attention. At 160 questions, our task was fairly lengthy, and likely
placed reasonable demands on effortful persistence, but future
studies might consider more formally examining the relationship
between task length, reward schedule and learning outcomes.
Future work might also consider how persistent use of an explicit
effort-contingent reward might either make a mastery approach
habitual and intrinsic or, in contrast, could actually serve to
undermine intrinsic motivation to exert effort toward difficult
tasks in the same way that extrinsic motivators have been shown
to reduce other types of intrinsically motivated behaviors (Deci,
1975; Deci et al., 1999, 2001).

Vallerand et al., 1992). Women also tend to demonstrate
greater verbal and language arts self-concepts (Skaalvik and
Skaalvik, 2004), and perform better on verbal episodic memory
tasks (Herlitz et al., 1997; Lewin et al., 2001; Herlitz and
Rehnman, 2008) including within similar paradigms to the
present study (Whiteman and Mangels, 2016; Mangels et al.,
2018). Together, these factors may have made women particularly
well-suited to thrive in our Effort group, in which intrinsically
motivating factors of internal control and competency were
highlighted within a challenging verbal episodic memory
task. Replication of these gender interactions and extension
across a wider range of tasks could be particularly useful for
educators aimed at finding methods to maximize learning and
engagement in students.
To the extent that rewards influenced learning in this study,
it appeared to be through general motivational mechanisms
rather than trial-level influences. A number of design factors may
have limited the trial-level effects of the reward manipulation.
Principally, we opted to use an indirect, deferred, and cumulative
reward (i.e., earning increased chances at a later raffle for money),
rather than an immediate, tangible reward for each item (e.g.,
money for each effortful response). While our approach may have
greater practicality in the classroom setting, it may have limited
item-level reward salience and instead, focused attention to the
overall task level. The timing of reward presentation after the
presentation of the to-be-remembered stimulus (i.e., the correct
answer), as well as the incidental nature of the learning task, may
also have reduced the ability of the reward to “tag” encoding
of a specific item. Although some studies have found that
rewards may enhance learning for information merely presented
within the same context, even without necessarily motivating
attention directly toward the to-be-learned information (i.e., a
“penumbra” effect; Murty and Adcock, 2013; Murayama and
Kitagami, 2014), these effects may not be as strong as when the
reward is contingent on learning or presented concurrently with
the to-be-remembered stimulus. Future studies could examine
the relative influence of reward timing by cueing the reward for
effort either before, concurrently with, or immediately following
the presentation of the correct answer to determine the context
under which item-level responses might emerge.
We also note that the overall effects of the Effort group
were not as robust as expected. Even though women’s error
remediation was generally greater in the Effort group compared
to the Control group, in some cases that difference was only
marginal, and it did not differ statistically from either the Luck
or Award groups. This may be due in part to the subtlety in
instruction variation across the four groups. In an effort to
control for overall motivation, instructions in all four groups
indicated that presentation of the rare, task-relevant stimulus
(i.e., the reward in Effort, Luck and Award groups; the to-becounted stimulus for the Control group) would be contingent on
overall performance in the task. Specifically, this stimulus would
be more likely to appear the better the participant did in the
task overall. Inclusion of a neutral group where either no postfeedback stimuli were provided, and/or no general instruction
to perform well was given, might provide a better contrast
in future studies.
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CONCLUSION
To our knowledge, this is the first study to consider how
extrinsic rewards that are effort-contingent, rather than
performance-contingent, can benefit long-term memory for
declarative information. As such, it addresses the intersection
of achievement motivation, reward-based learning systems,
and test-enhanced (i.e., feedback-based) learning of declarative
knowledge. Furthermore, it goes beyond treating extrinsic
rewards as a unidimensional motivational stimulus, and rather,
leverages the predictions of Cognitive Evaluation Theory to
consider the joint roles of competence and self-determination in
relationship to reward significance (Deci, 1975).
While our behavioral results were not as strong as expected
with respect to group-level differences, our findings suggest there
may be considerable opportunity for future research to explore
the nuanced relationships between reward, intrinsic motivation,
incidental learning and gender. This line of research has obvious
implications within academic settings in which discovering the
best ways to motivate students to expend effort toward learning
is a key objective. CET and related theories have been quite
influential over the past couple of decades; especially within
academics (Grolnick and Ryan, 1987; Reeve, 2012; Saeed and
Zyngier, 2012). However, much remains to be understood with
regards to how reward contexts shape the learning environment,
influence motivation over the long-term, and affect learning and
declarative memory.

ETHICS STATEMENT
The study was carried out at the University of Denver in
accordance with the recommendations from the University
of Denver Institutional Review Board (DU IRB) with written
informed consent from all participants. All participants gave
written informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki. The protocol was approved by the University of Denver
Institutional Review Board (DU IRB).

13

June 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 1179

Abraham et al.

An “A” for Effort

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

DA and JM contributed to the conception and design of
the study, analyzed the data, and wrote the manuscript.
DA collected the study data. KM contributed to study
design, interpretation related to the analysis, and editing
of the manuscript.

We thank Olivia Strauser, Carolyn Ford and Maria Kuharenko
for assistance in data collection and data preprocessing. We
also thank Daniel Schor, and Richard Gasparre for assistance in
stimulus and task development.

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
FUNDING
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found
online at: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.
2019.01179/full#supplementary-material

This research was supported by a PSC-CUNY Research Award
to Jennifer Mangels.

REFERENCES

Grolnick, W. S., and Ryan, R. M. (1987). Autonomy in children’s learning: an
experimental and individual difference investigation. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 52,
890–898. doi: 10.1037//0022-3514.52.5.890
Gruber, M. J., Gelman, B. D., and Ranganath, C. (2014). States of curiosity
modulate hippocampus-dependent learning via the dopaminergic circuit.
Neuron 84, 486–496. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2014.08.060
Henderson, V. L., and Dweck, C. S. (1990). Motivation and Achievement.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Herlitz, A., Nilsson, L.-G., and Bäckman, L. (1997). Gender differences in episodic
memory. Mem. Cogn. 25, 801–811. doi: 10.3758/BF03211324
Herlitz, A., and Rehnman, J. (2008). Sex differences in episodic memory. Curr. Dir.
Psychol. Sci. 17, 52–56. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8721.2008.00547.x
Hogan, R. M., and Kintsch, W. (1971). Differential effects of study and test trials on
long-term recognition and recall. J. Verbal Learn. Verbal Behav. 10, 562–567.
doi: 10.1016/S0022-5371(71)80029-4
Horvitz, J. (2000). Mesolimbocortical and nigrostriatal dopamine responses to
salient non-reward events. Neuroscience 96, 651–656. doi: 10.1016/S03064522(00)00019-1
Huang, C. (2012). Gender differences in academic self-efficacy: a meta-analysis.
Eur. J. Psychol. Educ. 28, 1–35. doi: 10.1007/s10212-011-0097-y
Jarosz, A. F., and Wiley, J. (2014). What are the odds? A practical guide to
computing and reporting bayes factors. J. Probl. Solving 7, 1–8. doi: 10.7771/
1932-6246.1167
JASP Team (2018). JASP (Version 0.9.2) [Computer Software].
Kang, M., Hsu, M., Krajbich, I., Lowenstein, G., McClure, S., Wang, J., et al. (2009).
The wick in the candle of learning: epistemic curiosity activates reward circuitry
and enhances memory. Psychol. Sci. 20, 963–973. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.
2009.02402.x
Kluger, A. N., and DeNisi, A. (1998). Feedback interventions: toward the
understanding of a double-edged sword. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 7, 67–72. doi:
10.1111/1467-8721.ep10772989
Knutson, B., Westdorp, A., Kaiser, E., and Hommer, D. (2000). FMRI visualization
of brain activity during a monetary incentive delay task. Neuroimage 12, 20–27.
doi: 10.1006/nimg.2000.0593
Kostandyan, M., Bombeke, K., Carsten, T., Krebs, R. M., Notebaert, W.,
and Boehler, C. N. (2019). Differential effects of sustained and transient
effort triggered by reward – A combined EEG and pupillometry study.
Neuropsychologia 123, 116–130. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2018.
04.032
Krebs, R. M., and Woldorff, M. G. (2017). “Cognitive control and reward,” in The
Wiley Handbook of Cognitive Control, ed. T. Egner (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley &
Sons), 422–439. doi: 10.1002/9781118920497.ch24
Lepper, M. R., Greene, D., and Nisbett, R. E. (1973). Undermining children’s
intrinsic interest with extrinsic reward: a test of the “overjustification”
hypothesis. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 28, 129–137. doi: 10.1037/h0035519
Levitt, S. D., List, J. A., and Sadoff, S. (2016a). The Effect of PerformanceBased Incentives on Educational Achievement: Evidence from a Randomized
Experiment. NBER Working Paper No. 22107.
Levitt, S. D., List, J. A., Neckermann, S., and Sadoff, S. (2016b). The behavioralist
goes to school: leveraging behavioral economics to improve educational

Adcock, R., Thangavel, A., Whitfield-Gabrieli, S., Knutson, B., and Gabrieli, J.
(2006). Reward-motivated learning: mesolimbic activation precedes memory
formation. Neuron 50, 507–517. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2006.03.036
Angrist, J., Oreopoulos, P., and Williams, T. (2014). When opportunity knocks,
who answers?: new evidence on college achievement awards. J. Hum. Resour.
49, 572–610. doi: 10.1353/jhr.2014.0019
Bunzeck, N., Dayan, P., Dolan, R., and Duzel, E. (2010). A common mechanism
for adaptive scaling of reward and novelty. Hum. Brain Mapp. 31, 1380–1394.
doi: 10.1002/hbm.20939
Butterfield, B., and Mangels, J. A. (2003). Neural correlates of error detection
and correction in a semantic retrieval task. Cogn. Brain Res. 17, 793–817.
doi: 10.1016/S0926-6410(03)00203-9
Butterfield, B., and Metcalfe, J. (2001). Errors committed with high confidence
are hypercorrected. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 27, 1491–1494. doi:
10.1037/0278-7393.27.6.1491
Butterfield, B., and Metcalfe, J. (2006). The correction of errors committed with
high confidence. Metacogn. Learn. 1, 69–84. doi: 10.1007/s11409-006-6894-z
Chiew, K. S., and Adcock, R. A. (2019). “Motivated memory: integrating cognitive
and affective neuroscience,” in Cambridge Handbook of Motivation and
Learning, eds K. Ann Renninger and D. Hidi Suzanne (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press).
Chiew, K. S., and Braver, T. S. (2013). Temporal dynamics of motivation-cognitive
control interactions revealed by high-resolution pupillometry. Front. Psychol.
4:15. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00015
Chiew, K. S., and Braver, T. S. (2016). Reward favors the prepared: incentive and
task-informative cues interact to enhance attentional control. J. Exp. Psychol.
Hum. Percept. Perform. 42, 52–66. doi: 10.1037/xhp0000129
Cokley, K. O., Bernard, N., Cunningham, D., and Motoike, J. (2001).
A psychometric investigation of the academic motivation scale using a
United States sample. Meas. Eval. Couns. Dev. 34, 109–119. doi: 10.1097/JPA.
0000000000000012
Deci, E. L. (ed.). (1975). “Cognitive evaluation theory: effects of extrinsic rewards
on intrinsic motivation,” in Intrinsic Motivation, (Boston, MA: Springer), 129–
159. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4613-4446-9_5
Deci, E. L., Koestner, R., and Ryan, R. M. (2001). Extrinsic rewards and intrinsic
motivation in education: reconsidered once again. Rev. Educ. Res. 71, 1–28.
doi: 10.3102/00346543071001001
Deci, E. L. E., Koestner, R. R., and Ryan, R. M. R. (1999). A meta-analytic review of
experiments examining the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation.
Psychol. Bull. 125, 627–700. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.125.6.627
Floresco, S. B., West, A. R., Ash, B., Moore, H., and Grace, A. A. (2003).
Afferent modulation of dopamine neuron firing differentially regulates tonic
and phasic dopamine transmission. Nat. Neurosci. 6, 968–973. doi: 10.1038/nn
1103
Glimcher, P. W. (2011). Understanding dopamine and reinforcement
learning: the dopamine reward prediction error hypothesis. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 108(Suppl._3), 15647–15654. doi: 10.1073/pnas.101426
9108

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

14

June 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 1179

Abraham et al.

An “A” for Effort

performance. Am. Econ. J. Econ. Policy 8, 183–219. doi: 10.1257/pol.201
30358
Lewin, C., Wolgers, G., and Herlitz, A. (2001). Sex differences favoring women in
verbal but not in visuospatial episodic memory. Neuropsychology 15, 165–173.
doi: 10.1037/0894-4105.15.2.165
Lisman, J., Grace, A. A., and Duzel, E. (2011). A neoHebbian framework for
episodic memory; role of dopamine-dependent late LTP. Trends Neurosci. 34,
536–547. doi: 10.1016/j.tins.2011.07.006
Lisman, J. E., and Grace, A. (2005). The hippocampal-VTA loop: controlling the
entry of information into long-term memory. Neuron 46, 703–713. doi: 10.
1016/j.neuron.2005.05.002
Locke, H. S., and Braver, T. S. (2008). Motivational influences on cognitive control:
behavior, brain activation, and individual differences. Cogn. Affect. Behav.
Neurosci. 8, 99–112. doi: 10.3758/CABN.8.1.99
Mangels, J. A., Butterfield, B., Lamb, J., Good, C., and Dweck, C. S. (2006). Why
do beliefs about intelligence influence learning success? A social cognitive
neuroscience model. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 1, 75–86. doi: 10.1093/scan/
nsl013
Mangels, J. A., Good, C., Whiteman, R. C., Maniscalco, B., and Dweck, C. S. (2011).
Emotion blocks the path to learning under stereotype threat. Soc. Cogn. Affect.
Neurosci. 7, 230–241. doi: 10.1093/scan/nsq100
Mangels, J. A., Hoxha, O., Lane, S. P., Jarvis, S. N., and Downey, G. (2018).
Evidence that disrupted orienting to evaluative social feedback undermines
error correction in rejection sensitive women. Soc. Neurosci. 13, 451–470. doi:
10.1080/17470919.2017.1358210
Mangels, J. A., Rodriguez, S., Ochakovskaya, Y., and Guerra-Carrillo, B.
(2017). Achievement goal task framing and fit with personal goals
modulate the neurocognitive response to corrective feedback. AERA Open
3:2332858417720875.
Manohar, S. G., Finzi, R. D., Drew, D., and Husain, M. (2017). Distinct motivational
effects of contingent and noncontingent rewards. Psychol. Sci. 28, 1016–1026.
doi: 10.1177/0956797617693326
Martin-Soelch, C., Szczepanik, J., Nugent, A., Barhaghi, K., Rallis, D.,
Herscovitch, P., et al. (2011). Lateralization and gender differences in
the dopaminergic response to unpredictable reward in the human ventral
striatum. Eur. J. Neurosci. 33, 1706–1715. doi: 10.1111/j.1460-9568.2011.
07642.x
Mather, M., and Schoeke, A. (2011). Positive outcomes enhance incidental learning
for both younger and older adults. Front. Neurosci. 5:129. doi: 10.3389/fnins.
2011.00129
McDaniel, M. A., Anderson, J. L., Derbish, M. H., and Morrisette, N. (2007).
Testing the testing effect in the classroom. Eur. J. Cogn. Psychol. 19, 494–513.
doi: 10.1080/09541440701326154
Metcalfe, J. (2017). Learning from errors. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 68, 465–489. doi:
10.1146/annurev-psych-010416-044022
Metcalfe, J., and Finn, B. (2011). People’s hypercorrection of high-confidence
errors: did they know it all along? J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 37,
437–448. doi: 10.1037/a0021962
Miendlarzewska, E. A., Bavelier, D., and Schwartz, S. (2016). Influence of reward
motivation on human declarative memory. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 61,
156–176. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2015.11.015
Miserandino, M. (1996). Children who do well in school: individual differences
in perceived competence and autonomy in above-average children. J. Educ.
Psychol. 88, 203–214. doi: 10.1037/0022-0663.88.2.203
Moser, J. S., Schroder, H. S., Heeter, C., Moran, T. P., and Lee, Y.-H. (2011).
Mind your errors: evidence for a neural mechanism linking growth mind-set
to adaptive posterror adjustments. Psychol. Sci. 22, 1484–1489. doi: 10.1177/
0956797611419520
Mueller, C. M., and Dweck, C. S. (1998). Praise for intelligence can undermine
children’s motivation and performance. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 75, 33–52. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.75.1.33
Murayama, K., and Kitagami, S. (2014). Consolidation power of extrinsic rewards:
reward cues enhance long-term memory for irrelevant past events. J. Exp.
Psychol. Gen. 143, 15–20. doi: 10.1037/a0031992
Murayama, K., and Kuhbandner, C. (2011). Money enhances memory
consolidation–But only for boring material. Cognition 119, 120–124.
doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2011.01.001

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

Murty, V. P., and Adcock, R. A. (2013). Enriched encoding: reward motivation
organizes cortical networks for hippocampal detection of unexpected events.
Cereb. Cortex 24, 2160–2168. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bht063
Niv, Y., Joel, D., and Dayan, P. (2006). A normative perspective on motivation.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 10, 375–381. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2006.06.010
Ochakovskaya, Y. (2018). Manipulating Goal States and Brain States: Using
EEG and HD-tDCS to Investigate Mechanisms Underlying the Influence of
Achievement Goals on Declarative Memory. New York, NY: CUNY Academic
Works. Available at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/2830
Patil, A., Murty, V. P., Dunsmoor, J. E., Phelps, E. A., and Davachi, L. (2016).
Reward retroactively enhances memory consolidation for related items. Learn.
Mem. 24, 65–69. doi: 10.1101/lm.042978.116
Redondo, R. L., and Morris, R. G. M. (2011). Making memories last: the synaptic
tagging and capture hypothesis. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 12, 17–30. doi: 10.1038/
nrn2963
Reeve, J. (2012). “A self-determination theory perspective on student engagement,”
in Handbook of Research on Student Engagement, eds S. L. Christenson, A. L.
Reschly, and C. Wylie (Boston, MA: Springer), 149–172. doi: 10.1007/978-14614-2018-7_7
Ryan, R. M. (1982). Control and information in the intrapersonal sphere: An
extension of cognitive evaluation theory. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 43, 450–461.
doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.43.3.450
Ryan, R. M., Mims, V., and Koestner, R. (1983). Relation of reward contingency and
interpersonal context to intrinsic motivation: a review and test using cognitive
evaluation theory. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 45, 736–750. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.45.
4.736
Saeed, S., and Zyngier, D. (2012). How motivation influences student engagement:
a qualitative case study. J. Educ. Learn. 1, 252–267. doi: 10.5539/jel.v1n2p252
Schultz, W. (1998). Predictive reward signal of dopamine neurons. J. Neurophysiol.
80, 1–27. doi: 10.1152/jn.1998.80.1.1
Schultz, W. (2001). Reward signaling by dopamine neurons. Neuroscientist 7,
293–302. doi: 10.1177/107385840100700406
Schunk, D. (1985). Self-efficacy and classroom learning. Psychol. Sch. 22, 208–223.
doi: 10.1002/1520-6807(198504)22:2<208::aid-pits2310220215>3.0.co;2-7
Schunk, D. H., Pintrich, P. R., and Meece, J. L. (2008). Motivation in Education:
Theory, Research, and Applications, 3rd Edn. London: Pearson.
Shigemune, Y., Tsukiura, T., Kambara, T., and Kawashima, R. (2013).
Remembering with gains and losses: effects of monetary reward and
punishment on successful encoding activation of source memories. Cereb.
Cortex 24, 1319–1331. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhs415
Shim, S., and Ryan, A. (2005). Changes in self-efficacy, challenge avoidance, and
intrinsic value in response to grades: the role of achievement goals. J. Exp. Educ.
73, 333–349. doi: 10.3200/JEXE.73.4.333-349
Sitzman, D. M., Rhodes, M. G., Tauber, S. K., and Liceralde, V. R. T. (2015). The
role of prior knowledge in error correction for younger and older adults. Aging
Neuropsychol. Cogn. 22, 502–516. doi: 10.1080/13825585.2014.993302
Skaalvik, S., and Skaalvik, E. M. (2004). Gender differences in math and verbal
self-concept, performance expectations, and motivation. Sex Roles 50, 241–252.
doi: 10.1023/B:SERS.0000015555.40976.e6
Spreckelmeyer, K. N., Krach, S., Kohls, G., Rademacher, L., Irmak, A., Konrad, K.,
et al. (2009). Anticipation of monetary and social reward differently activates
mesolimbic brain structures in men and women. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 4,
158–165. doi: 10.1093/scan/nsn051
Stanek, J. K., Dickerson, K. C., Chiew, K. S., Clement, N. J., and Adcock,
R. A. (2019). Expected reward value and reward uncertainty have temporally
dissociable effects on memory formation. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 265, 1–12. doi:
10.1162/jocn_a_01411
Unkelbach, C., and Greifeneder, R. (eds). (2013). The Experience of Thinking:
How the Fluency of Mental Processes Influences Cognition(and)Behaviour. Hove:
Psychology Press.
Vallerand, R. J. (1989). Vers une méthodologie de validation trans-culturelle
de questionnaires psychologiques: implications pour la recherche en langue
française. Can. Psychol. 30, 662–680. doi: 10.1037/h0079856
Vallerand, R. J., Pelletier, L. G., Blais, M. R., Briere, N. M., Senecal, C., and
Vallieres, E. F. (1992). The academic motivation scale: a measure of intrinsic,
extrinsic, and amotivation in education. Educ. Psychol. Meas. 52, 1003–1017.
doi: 10.1177/0013164492052004025

15

June 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 1179

Abraham et al.

An “A” for Effort

Wang, S. H., Redondo, R. L., and Morris, R. G. M. (2010). Relevance of synaptic
tagging and capture to the persistence of long-term potentiation and everyday
spatial memory. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 107, 19537–19542. doi: 10.1073/
pnas.1008638107
Whiteman, R., and Mangels, J. A. (2016). Rumination and rebound from failure
as a function of gender and time on task. Brain Sci. 6:E7. doi: 10.3390/
brainsci6010007
Wilgenbusch, T., and Merrell, K. W. (1999). Gender differences in self-concept
among children and adolescents: a meta-analysis of multidimensional studies.
Sch. Psychol. Q. 14, 101–120. doi: 10.1037/h0089000
Wise, S. L., and Kong, X. (2005). Response time effort: a new measure for examinee
motivation in computer-based tests. Appl. Meas. Educ. 18, 163–183. doi: 10.
1207/s15324818ame1802_2
Wittig, M., Marks, G., and Jones, G. (1981). Luck versus effort attributions. Pers.
Soc. Psychol. Bull. 7, 71–78. doi: 10.1177/014616728171011
Wittmann, B., Schott, B., Guderian, S., Frey, J., Heinze, H., and Düzel, E. (2005).
Reward-related FMRI activation of dopaminergic midbrain is associated with
enhanced hippocampus-dependent long-term memory formation. Neuron 45,
459–467. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2005.01.010

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

Wittmann, B. C., Dolan, R. J., and Duzel, E. (2011). Behavioral specifications of
reward-associated long-term memory enhancement in humans. Learn. Mem.
18, 296–300. doi: 10.1101/lm.1996811
Wolf, L. F., Smith, J. K., and Birnbaum, M. E. (1995). Consequences
of performance, test motivation, and mentally taxing items.
Appl.
Meas.
Educ.
8,
341–351.
doi:
10.1207/s15324818ame0
804_4
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2019 Abraham, McRae and Mangels. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original
publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice.
No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with
these terms.

16

June 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 1179

